• Auctions Consistent with FAR
• Auctions credited with significant savings • However, auction theory and mechanism design can greatly assist in determining what should be procured -We propose a procurement mechanism -answer to the how question -which endogenously answers other 3 questions
The Information Problem
• Determining what to procure is complicated by the fact that the relevant information is:
-Incomplete: Neither the procuring organization nor any individual contractor possess all the relevant information -Diffuse: Relevant information is spread out among the procuring organization and all of its potential contractors -Private: Relevant information may be known by one or few contractors who have little incentive to truthfully reveal
• The economic field of mechanism design is devoted to developing systems which:
-Create incentives for actors to truthfully reveal information -Efficiently aggregate diverse and often conflicting information -Identify optimal choices based on aggregated information
Stylized Procurement Problem
• True value of procured product/service depends on:
-Performance along various measures (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , …)
• Aircraft example: Speed, maneuverability, range, reliability, etc.
-Relative importance/weighting of each measure (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , …)
• Information about appropriate weights incomplete, diffuse, and private
• Ex ante information (before bids or announcements):
-DoD and contractors have some incomplete and independent information about optimal weighting of each performance measure 
Conclusions
• Auction theory and mechanism design have a lot to offer for defense procurement 
